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Reply 
Reply: Clawback to the Future 
Miriam A. Cherry† and Jarrod Wong†† 
In Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures in an Era of 
Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes (the “Ar-
ticle”), we undertook the task of proposing a doctrine of claw-
backs that would not only furnish a framework for analyzing 
the term more systematically, but would also describe the ways 
the doctrine would relate to established rules of contract law.1 
With his response, In the Shadow of the Omnipresent Claw: In 
Response to Professors Cherry & Wong (the “Response”),2 Mi-
chael Macchiarola has provided us with an opportunity to arti-
culate these thoughts on the doctrine of clawbacks further, and 
for that opportunity and his careful reading of the Article, we 
thank him. 
In essence, the Response takes issue with the Article in 
three respects;3 first, with what it terms the “newer” applica-
tion of clawbacks to “the recoupment of corporate executive 
compensation”4; second, with the purported “latent subjectivity” 
of clawbacks generally;5 and third, with the apparent opera-
tional difficulties of implementing prospective clawbacks, in-
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 1. See generally Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospec-
tive Contract Measures in an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and 
Ponzi Schemes, 94 MINN. L. REV. 368 (2009). 
 2. Michael C. Macchiarola, In the Shadow of the Omnipresent Claw: In 
Response to Professors Cherry & Wong, 95 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 1 (2010). 
 3. While the Response has other quibbles with the Article, we believe the 
three concerns we identified represent its core, and we accordingly limit this 
space-constrained Reply to addressing the same.  
 4. Macchiarola, supra note 2, at 10. 
 5. Id. at 3. 
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cluding those relating to measurement and enforcement.6 As 
for the first critique questioning the application of clawbacks to 
executive compensation, recent events, including the passage of 
the Dodd-Frank Act blunts the extent of the criticism. The 
Dodd-Frank Act, which establishes mandatory clawback poli-
cies in the event of an accounting restatement, ensures that 
clawbacks will be a significant part of the executive compensa-
tion landscape for the foreseeable future.  
As to the second critique, we agree to some extent with the 
Response that clawbacks and the concept of unfair enrichment 
that we described may increase the overall complexity of con-
tracts. However, the additional complexity that the Response 
complains of arises in many instances in which an equitable 
remedy exists. In this way, the clawback doctrine operates no 
differently from many existing equitable doctrines, including, 
for example, its close cousin, the doctrine of unjust enrichment. 
Moreover, like these other doctrines, the parameters of the doc-
trine can and will only be more precisely delineated with time. 
Further, many of the Response’s fundamental objections to 
clawbacks on account of their “subjectivity” apply only to ret-
roactive clawbacks, and not to prospective clawbacks. It bears 
noting, therefore, that the Article draws and, indeed, empha-
sizes the critical distinction between the two. We not only iden-
tify and explain the difficulties associated with the retroactive 
imposition of clawbacks, but affirmatively recommend writing 
clawback provisions into contracts prospectively.  
On the final critique, we believe that many of the potential 
operational difficulties the Response would associate with 
prospective clawbacks will be minimized because their contrac-
tual nature requires parties to agree upon, and thus direct 
their attention to the content and operability of, such claw-
backs. And again, in the course of time and practice, any such 
difficulties will be addressed and ameliorated. We address all 
three critiques in more detail below. 
I.  THE DODD-FRANK ACT: CLAWBACKS AND THE 
FUTURE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION   
The Response notes that “[i]ncreasingly, politicians, com-
mentators and regulators are embracing some recoupment 
method to correct perceived past wrongs” in regard to executive 
 
 6. See id. at 12–17. 
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compensation,7 and that some of this is attributable to “political 
posturing.”8 The Response goes on to question whether certain 
executive compensation scenarios should be subject to claw-
backs at all.9 In its view, “the current crop of examples [involv-
ing clawbacks in the area of executive compensation] derives 
from shakier statutory footing and suffers from far less robust 
precedent upon which to rely.”10 In other words, the Response 
appears to suggest that executive compensation does not raise 
the kind of legitimate concerns that should be addressed by 
clawbacks.  
However, the outcry over bonuses, and subsequent events, 
have since shown that the Response holds a minority view. Re-
cently, even Judge Richard Posner has (albeit reluctantly) come 
to the view that executive overcompensation is problematic.11 
Further, events have moved quickly, and rather than specula-
tion about the actions of future politicians or regulators, we 
have recently enacted legislation to look to for guidance on 
these matters that affirms the “newer,” if not prescient, views 
expressed in the Article. Indeed, the Dodd-Frank Act,12 passed 
in the summer of 2010, writes clawbacks into law, providing 
them a firm grip on the law of executive compensation.  
 
 7. Id. at 12. We would respectfully submit that the events that tran-
spired were actual wrongs, not a mere perception. 
 8. Id. at 3. 
 9. For example, the Response states that “not all will agree with the au-
thors’ assertion that . . . ‘payment of the bonus [to an otherwise blameless AIG 
executive] is unfair because bonuses should not be decoupled from a company’s 
performance, particularly where taxpayer money is involved.’” Id. at 7 n.21. 
The Response notes that there are certain scenarios, for example involving a 
compliance officer or in-house attorney, where AIG might become “more valu-
able as the company’s performance beg[ins] to wane” and it would therefore be 
appropriate to decouple that individual’s bonus from a company’s performance. 
Id. at 6. This assertion, however, fails to account for or even address the fact 
that funding by the taxpayer may nonetheless render this situation unfair.  
 10. Id. at 10–11. 
 11. See Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, if So, What 
if Anything Should Be Done About It?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1020 (2009) (de-
scribing larger pay packages received by American CEOs when compared with 
their foreign counterparts). This discrepancy may perhaps be a result of the 
comparatively larger role of labor in foreign corporate governance process. 
Statistics, circa 2003, put the gap at 500 times that of the average worker at 
the company. CEOs and Their Indian Rope Trick, ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 2004, 
at 61, available at 2004 WLNR 14012834. 
 12. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376. 
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Specifically, section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act provides, as 
a requirement for listing on a public exchange, that issuers 
must have a specific type of clawback in place: 
[I]n the event that the issuer is required to prepare an accounting 
restatement due to the material noncompliance of the issuer with any 
financial reporting requirement under the securities laws, the issuer 
will recover from any current or former executive officer of the issuer 
who received incentive-based compensation (including stock options 
awarded as compensation) during the 3-year period preceding the 
date on which the issuer is required to prepare an accounting re-
statement, based on the erroneous data, in excess of what would have 
been paid to the executive officer under the accounting restatement.13 
Titled “Recovery of Erroneously Awarded Compensation,”14 
the provision is wide-ranging, applying to both current and 
former executive officers. Although the executive need not for-
feit all of the compensation over the last three years, he or she 
must return the incentive pay that was based on faulty ac-
counting.15 This is a major step forward and one that we ap-
plaud.  
On the other hand, this provision certainly could be 
stronger. There is no procedural mechanism in the Dodd-Frank 
Act for enforcement, which means that shareholders would 
have to bring a derivative suit, an action that is potentially 
procedurally difficult for shareholders.16 The Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) could also bring an enforcement ac-
tion, but given the dearth of actions brought under the (signifi-
cantly weaker) Sarbanes-Oxley clawbacks, one wonders if the 
SEC will be more proactive with this enhanced directive. None-
theless, the passing of the Dodd-Frank Act reaffirms the posi-
tion that executive overcompensation is a continuing, current 
problem.  
Additionally, as the Response notes, many companies have 
already established clawback policies for executives on their 
own, as part of best practices. As we noted in the Appendix to 
the Article, there is a wide variation of clawback provisions. 
Some are much more harsh than others; others place a good 
deal of discretion in the board to determine whether any re-
coupment should apply; still others are only triggered by mis-
 
 13. Id. § 954(b)(2). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Hidden Impacts of the Dodd-Frank Act, N.Y. 
L.J., July 15, 2010, at 5, available at 7/15/2010 N.Y.L.J. 5, (col. 2). 
 16. See id. (“[P]laintiffs will probably have to rely on the traditional deriv-
ative suit.”). 
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conduct or criminal action against an executive. Others are 
triggered by the requirement of “bad faith,” which again invests 
a great deal of discretion in the board of directors to determine. 
The SEC’s requirement that an accounting restatement trigger 
the clawback provides an objective benchmark. Companies, of 
course, are free to impose stricter clawback provisions, but they 
cannot fall below the mark set by the clawback required in the 
Dodd-Frank Act if they are to be listed. 
The future has arrived, and new or not, clawbacks in ex-
ecutive compensation are here to stay. 
II.  THE FUTURE FORWARD: TIME HEALS ALL WOUNDS 
(EVEN THOSE OF SUBJECTIVITY)   
In the Article, we proposed that clawbacks be defined as “a 
right to, or action for, the restitution of unfair enrichment that 
is otherwise justified or permitted under prevailing applicable 
law.”17 As we view it, “unfair enrichment” is enrichment that 
results in “inequities that cannot easily be resolved by existing 
remedies under the law because of countervailing legal rights 
independently supporting such inequities.”18 For example, 
while “it seems unfair that an executive at AIG could walk 
away with a bonus when the company he had a responsibility 
to assist is failing[,] . . . under existing law, making an equita-
ble claim under these circumstances is problematic as it must 
tackle the executive’s original contractual claim to the bonus.”19  
The Response complains that this concept of “‘unfair 
enrichment’ . . . introduces unwelcomed subjectivity to deci-
sions of whether and to what extent a person’s monies might be 
subject to return at some future date.”20 It is true of course that 
the application of clawbacks will require a determination of 
whether and to what extent any enrichment is “unfair,” and 
further, that this may be a fact-intensive inquiry that may 
yield different answers close to the margin. However, “[t]hat 
there are differences among the conclusions reached by various 
models when different input values are used in those models 
does not render a theory or technique unreliable.”21 The claw-
back is a relatively new phenomenon, or at least, hitherto, it 
 
 17. Cherry & Wong, supra note 1, at 412. 
 18. Id. at 414. 
 19. Id. at 413. 
 20. Macchiarola, supra note 2, at 6–7. 
 21. Aero-Motive Co. v. Becker, No. 1:99-CV-384, 2001 WL 1698998, at *3 
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 6, 2001). 
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“‘has been subject to neither rigorous analytical scrutiny nor 
definition and exposition.’”22 Courts are still coming to grips 
with clawbacks and will no doubt hone and explicate the theory 
in the years to come. Indeed, even its long-established close 
cousin, unjust enrichment, is still seen today as an evolving 
“flexible broad-based theory”23 with such “unanticipated poten-
tial”24 that “many scholars advocate a narrow and more pre-
dictable reach for restitution.”25 More to the point, it remains 
the case that “the framework of restitution is not agreed upon 
by scholars or courts.”26 It is therefore instructive to note that 
the Response itself makes the same point with respect to the 
concept of fraudulent transfer that will apply a fortiori to that 
of unfair enrichment: “While the requirements of fraudulent 
conveyance might introduce a certain layer of subjectivity, such 
concerns are diminishing over time, as precedent and case law 
establish its parameters with increasing detail.”27  
Moreover, many of the Response’s fundamental concerns 
regarding subjectivity are relevant only to retroactive claw-
backs, and greatly diminish when one invokes prospective con-
tractual clawbacks. The latter requires that parties agree upon 
the very terms and nature of the clawbacks at the inception of 
the contracts—whether, for example, we are talking about 
clawback provisions in investment or employment contracts. 
This means that insofar as prospective clawbacks are con-
cerned, all parties are literally on the same page regarding 
“whether and to what extent [the individual’s] monies might be 
subject to return at some future date.”28 Having themselves de-
fined the triggers for clawbacks, the parties will not have to 
 
 22. Macchiarola, supra note 2, at 2 (quoting Cherry & Wong, supra note 1, 
at 411). 
 23. Debra L. Greenfield, Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital: Unjust 
Enrichment and the Patenting of Human Genetic Material, 15 ANNALS 
HEALTH L. 213, 214 (2006). 
 24. Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, Restitution in Public Concern Cases, 
36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 901, 904 (2003). 
 25. Id. at 903.  
 26. Id. at 905. Another instance of a doctrine that is well established, but 
not entirely predictable, is that of unconscionability. See, e.g., Paul Bennett 
Marrow, Squeezing Subjectivity from the Doctrine of Unconscionability, 53 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 187, 187 (2005–2006) (“Determinations about unconscion-
ability are subjective. To date no one has been able to articulate an objective 
standard. Statutes that empower the judiciary to make findings of unconscio-
nability almost uniformly fail to define what qualifies. Judges are left to fa-
shion solutions that they, and they alone, believe address their charge.”). 
 27. Macchiarola, supra note 2, at 9. 
 28. Id. at 7. 
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contend with the “troubling” prospect of a lack of “the predic-
tive value of the rule of law.”29 Similarly, to the charge by the 
Response that “[m]ost basically, the authors fail to answer why 
the contractual risk bargained for by two arms-length parties 
should be subject to the later assessment of an interloping arbi-
ter,”30 it again bears observing that in relation to prospective 
clawback provisions, there is no interloping arbiter for it is the 
parties themselves who will have agreed on when and how the 
underlying contractual bargain is modified. 
A central pillar of the Article is the critical distinction it 
draws between “retroactive clawbacks—those that . . . are im-
posed after the contractual right to the bonuses has arisen and 
the benefits have been conferred—and prospective clawbacks 
that are introduced into contracts before the claim of right to 
the benefits has arisen.”31 Precisely because “any efforts to cure 
the inequity retroactively have to confront the particular legal 
rights that make the inequity possible”32 and lead to considera-
ble difficulties of implementation (including potential problems 
of subjectivity), we have “argued that prospective clawbacks 
will be a far more effective way of addressing the various [is-
sues] that arise in executive compensation and Ponzi 
schemes.”33 
III.  THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CLAWBACKS   
The Response also fusses over the technical details of im-
plementing clawbacks.34 One particular concern is what the 
Response refers to as “measurement problems” associated with 
defining triggers for clawbacks in a meaningful fashion, say, for 
recovering executive overcompensation.35 This enterprise will 
of course not be full grown at its inception, but the contractual 
nature of prospective clawbacks will mean that the parties will 
generally negotiate and therefore focus explicitly on the scope 
and content of such clawbacks. The conflicting incentives of the 
parties provide further cause for optimism that their triggers 
will be carefully described. Accordingly, any “measurement 
problems” will be significantly reduced over time.  
 
 29. Id. at 7. 
 30. Id.  
 31. Cherry & Wong, supra note 1, at 372 (emphasis in original). 
 32. Id. at 415 (emphasis in original). 
 33. Id. at 416. 
 34. See Macchiarola, supra note 2, at 12–17. 
 35. Id. at 15. 
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The Response also worries about certain practicalities of 
collection. For example, the Response mentions the “practical 
difficulties of getting employees to return paychecks that they 
have already cashed, spent, and paid taxes on,” and notes that 
these are “likely to represent a significant burden to effective 
implementation.”36 However, these problems are far from in-
surmountable, as these are precisely the issues that payroll 
processors and forensic accountants deal with on a daily basis. 
While any such collection should be monitored for accuracy, for 
example, to ensure that the clawback amount takes into ac-
count the amount of applicable tax that has been paid, this is 
not that difficult of a calculation to perform.  
As an illustration, we offer our own (perhaps ironic) exam-
ple. After winning our school’s Sprankling Award for Faculty 
Scholarship based in part on the Article, we were accidentally 
given two bonuses—one via check at the award ceremony, and 
one via direct deposit through payroll. When the matter came 
to our attention, we agreed that one of the transactions would 
need to be unwound. Such was the case even though one of us 
had in the interim cashed the check in addition to receiving the 
bonus through direct deposit, and had bills automatically and 
electronically paid from those deposited funds. Although there 
was initially some confusion about the amount to be paid back 
(i.e., whether it was net or gross after tax), the matter was re-
solved with a few emails to the payroll department and the 
money was returned. While there was perhaps some fifteen to 
twenty minutes’ worth of administrative energy expended on 
the exercise, it was far from an insurmountable or impractica-
ble task.37 
Another concern raised by the Response is that of en-
forceability.38 The Response questions “whether (and to what 
extent) privately negotiated provisions, whether in the invest-
ment agreement or executive compensation context, will be 
respected by a regulator or a court.”39 But prospective claw-
backs, like any other privately negotiated provision, are bind-
ing on the parties and there is no reason to think that they will 
 
 36. Id.  
 37. We recognize of course that our situation involves neither a prospec-
tive clawback nor unfair enrichment. The point here, however, is that the col-
lection issues raised by the Response (and which are equally applicable to our 
situation) are not as insuperable as the Response makes them out to be. 
 38. Macchiarola, supra note 2, at 16. 
 39. Id.  
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not be similarly enforced as a straightforward matter of con-
tract law. That they may be challenged by resort to “appeals 
and legislative influence”40 speaks only to how our legal system 
functions as a whole, and does not begin to differentiate a dis-
pute over prospective clawbacks from any other legal dispute. 
As things stand, there is a distinct policy in favor of clawbacks 
that will encourage if not ensure their enforcement. In the 
realm of executive compensation, as discussed above, the Dodd-
Frank Act explicitly requires clawbacks,41 whereas in the area 
of Ponzi schemes, the rationale articulated by courts in favor of 
applying the netting rule—that is, to narrow the gap between 
winning and losing investors—would extend readily to the ap-
plication of prospective clawbacks.42  
The Response additionally suggests, however, that even if 
there was no dispute over their scope, clawbacks may not be en-
forced because, for example, a company may decide to “waive 
the repayment requirement of an employee unable to return 
the required amount without undue hardship.”43 That an indi-
vidual company or investor may choose not to enforce a con-
tractual right to monies says nothing about whether there 
should be such a right. Instead, it says everything about the 
executory nature of contract law enforcement mechanisms. In 
short, enforcing prospective clawbacks is, in general, no more 
problematic than enforcing a(ny) contractual obligation.  
  CONCLUSION   
“Buzz Lightyear: Who is in charge here? Alien Toys (in tone 
of reverence): The Claw . . . The Claw chooses who will go and 
who will stay.” 
–Toy Story.44 
The Response suggests that “employees or investors will 
come to fear that their monies are forever doomed to the fate of 
the stuffed animal in the arcade game—never free to relax in 
the shadow of the omnipresent claw.”45 Yet, in Toy Story, a 
movie narrated from the perspective of sentient toys, the alien 
toys who lived in the arcade game actually celebrated, rather 
than feared, the omnipresent (omnipotent?) claw.  
 
 40. Id. 
 41. See supra Part I. 
 42. Cherry & Wong, supra note 1, at 402–06. 
 43. Macchiarola, supra note 2, at 16. 
 44. TOY STORY (Walt Disney Pictures/Pixar Animation Studio 1995). 
 45. Macchiarola, supra note 2, at 7–8. 
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In truth, only those who hide inside and look back from the 
shame of having unfairly collected monies need cower in the 
shadow of the claw. Others who look forward to a bright future 
outside the box, much like the sentient toys in Toy Story, may 
well embrace what the claw represents. 
